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RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
Supreme Court of Pennylvania.
JAMES C. VAN DYKE ET AL. v. ELIZABETH VAN DYKE ET AL.
Although a will may be ineffectual to pass land in another state, because not
attested by subscribing witnesses, yet an heir at law to whom a legacy is given
from the testator's Pennsylvania estate, the will being valid in this state, will be
put to his election, and will not be permitted to claim the gift without giving
assent to everything contained in the instrument.
The English rule that cases in which a legacy is given by an unattested will
upon the express condition that the legatee shall give up his claim to real estate
devised away from him, are to be distinguished from those in which such a condi-
tion is clearly implied, rests upon no sufficient reason, and cannot be satisfactorily
explained. The clear intention of a testator should not be frustrated upon
authorities establishing a distinction without any difference.
The doctrine of equitable election is grounded upon the ascertained intention of
the testator, and the court can resort to every part of the will to arrive at it, in
construing a bequest within its rightful jurisdiction.
Equitable election rests upon the principle of compensation; and not of forfeit-
ure, which applies only to the non-performance of an express condition.
Courts of equity in Pennsylvania have jurisdiction in cases of election on the
ground of trust; although the case arises under a will, and bears incidentally
upon the settlement of a decedent's estate. The jurisdiction of the Orphans'
Court is concurrent, but not exclusive.
ON appeal in equity from a decree of the Court of Nisi Prius.
Dr. Frederick A. Van Dyke, a citizen of Pehnsylvania, domi-
ciled in Philadelphia, died, leaving a will which was duly admit-
ted to probate in Philadelphia.
The decedent was owner of personal estate, and of real estate
in Pennsylvania and also in New Jersey.
By his will he gave to his daughters legacies to be paid from
.his estate in Pennsylvania (which nearly exhausted it), and devised
the residue of his Pennsylvania estate, and his lands in New
Jersey (particularly describing them), to his sons, in equal shares.
- The will, having no subscribing witness, was ineffectual to pass
land in New Jersey, and as to the testator's real estate there, he
died intestate, and his daughters take in equal shares with his
sons.
This was a bill filed on behalf of the sons, alleging that the
testator meant to exclude all but his sons fron his New Jersey
property; and that he intended that his daughters should take no
more than the legacies he had bequeathed to them. The prayer
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was that they might be put to their election, either to give effect
to the whole will by relinquishing their claim to the New Jersey
property; or, from their legacies, to compensate the sons for their
loss in consequence of the daughters sharing with them the New
Jersey property.
No issue of fact was raised by the answers, and the question
which came before the court was simply whether the legatees
were bound to elect. -
pE. C oppe Mitchell and -Edward Olmated, for appellants.
C. E. Morgart and Vls liam A. Por r, for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHAESWooD, J.-No question has been made by the parties as
to the jurisdiction of a court o equity in this state to, give the
relief prayed for in this bill. It having been suggested that it
would be an encroachment upon that which by the Acts of
Assembly is exclusively conferred 'upon the Orphans' Court, the
attention of the counsel was directed to this point when the cause
was ordered for reargument. The learned and able gentlemen
retained for the defendants have, however, frankly conceded it.
Consent, indeed, cannot give jurisdiction, and it is therefore
deemed proper to say that we entertain no doubt upon the subject.
The. Orphans' Court, by the Act of June 16th 1886, § 19, Pamph.
L. 792, has jurisdiction of proceedings for the recovery of legacies
---of the settlement of the accounts of executors-the distribution
of the estates of decedents--and in all cases wherein executors may
be possessed of or in any way accountable for any real *or personal
estate of a decedent. It is also the settled doctrine that the juris-
diction of that court within its appointed orbit is exclusive: White-
side v. Whiteside, 8 Harris 473; Solleuberger8' Appeal, 9 Harris
337; Black v. Black, 10 Casey 354; and, no doubt, a court of equity
cannot interfere with a matter of which the Orphans' Court has ex-
clusive jurisdiction: Loomis v. Loomis, 3 Casey 233; .Biddle v.
Bickley, 9 Casey 276. But it is not in every case which may inci-
dentally bear upon the settlement of the estate of a decedent that
its jurisdiction is exclusive; otherwise all remedies for the recovery
of claims against such estate would necessarily be drawn within its
vortex. This has never been pretended: McLean's Executors v.
Wade, 3 P. F. Smith 145; Seryeant'8 -Executors v. Ewing, 6
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Casey 75. This is not a proceeding to recover a legacy charged
on land, nor to compel a settlement or distribution, but falls within
the admitted scope of the authority of a court of equity in cases
of trust. The legal title being in the defendants as heirs at law,
that court, if it is a case of election, holds them bound, as
trustees, to compensate the devisees disappointed of the bounty
intended for them by the testator. The jurisdiction in such a
case is expressly recognised as concurrent in Lewid v. Lewis, 1
Harris 79. The decree of this court will doubtless be conclusive
as to the subject-matter upon the final settlement of the accounts
of the executors, but so would a judgment against them in a
court of law, if no fraud or collusion were shown. We pass
therefore to the main question.
It may certainly be considered as settled in England, that if a
will purporting to devise real estpte, but ineffectually because not
attested according to the Statute of Frauds, gives a legacy to the
heir at law, he cannot be put to his election: Hearle v. Green-
bank, 3 Atk. 695; Thellusson v. Woodford, 13 Yes. 209; Buck-
ridge v. Ingram, 2 Ves. Jr. 652; Sheddon v. Goodrich, 8 Yes.
482. These cases have been recognised and followed in this
country: Melchor v. Burger, 1 Dev. & Batt. Eq. 634; JiM.Elfresh
v. Schley, 1 Gill .181; Jones v. Jones, 8 Id. 197; Kearney v.
MComb, 1 0. E. Green 189. Yet it is equally well established
that if the testator annexes an express condition to the bequest
of the personalty, the duty of election will be enforced: Boughton
v. Boughton, 2 Yes. 12; Whistler v. WVebster, 2 Yes. Jr. 652;
Ker v. Wauchope, 1 Bligh 1; He.Elfresh v. Scley, 1 Gill 181.
That this distinction rests upon no sufficient reason has been
admitted by almost every judge before whom the question has
arisen. Why an express condition should prevail, and one how-
ever clearly implied should not, has never been and cannot be
satisfactorily explained. It is said that a disposition absolutely
void is no disposition at all, and being incapable of effect as such,
it cannot be read to ascertain the intent of the testator. But an
express condition annexed to the .bequest of the personalty does
not make the disposition of the realty valid: it would be a repeal
of the Statute of Frauds so to hold. How then can it operate
any more than an implied condition to open the eyes of the court
so as to enable them to read those parts of the will which relate
to the realty-and without a knowledge of what they are, how can
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the condition be enforced ? "As to the question of the election,"
said Lord KENYON, while Master of the Rolls, "the cases which
have been cited are certainly great authorities; but I must confess
I should have great difficulty in making 'the same distinctions if
they had come before me. They have said you shall not look into
a will unattested so as to raise the condition which would be
implied from the -devise if it had appeared; but if you give a
legacy on condition that the legatee shall give the lands, then he
must elect. However, I am bound by the force of authorities to
tale no notice whatever of the unattested will, as far as relates to
the freehold estate :" Carey t. Askew, 1 Cox 241. "I do not
understand," said Sir WILLIAm GRANT, "why a will, though not
executed so as to pass real estate, should not be read for the
purpose of discovering in it an implied condition .concerning real
estate annexed to a gift of personal property; as it is admitted it
must be read when such condition is expressly annexed to such
gift. For if, by a sound construction, such condition is 4ightly
inferred from the whole instrument, the effect seems t6 be the
same" as if it was expressed in words :" Brodie v. _Barry, 2 Yes.
& Bea. 127.' So Lord ELDON declared that "the distinctions'
upon this head of law. appear to be rather unsubstantial," and
that "these are undoubtedly thin distinctions, and a judge
having to deal with them, finds a difficulty in stating to his own-
mind satisfactory'principles on which they may be grounded :'*
Ker v7 Wauchope, 1 Bligh 1. And in another place: "The;
reason of that distinction, if it was res integra, is questionable."
"With Lord KENYON, .I think the distinction such as the mind
cannot well fasten upon :" ,Seddon v. Goodrich, 8 Yes. 482.
Mr. Justice KENNEDY has expressed the same opinion. "W then
a cohdition is necessarily implied by a construction in regard-to'
which there can be but one opinion, there can be no good reason-,
why the result or decision of the court should not be the same as
in the case of an express condition, and the donee bound to- make
an election in the one case as well as the other :" ity1 of Phila-.
delphia v. Davis, 1 Whart. 510.
There is another class of cases in England wholly irreconcil-.
able with this shadowy distinction; for the heir at law of' a copy-
hold was formerly put to his election, though there lad" been to
surrender to the uses of the will. This was previous to.55 Geo,.
Ii. c' 192: 1 White & Tudor's Leading Cas. 239 note. Yet as-
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Sir WILLIAMr GRANT has remarked: "A will, however executed,
was as inoperative for the conveyance of copyhold, as-a will defect.
ively executed is for the conveyance of freehold estate :" Brodie
v. Barry, 2 Yes. & B. 130.
The mind instinctively shrinks from the task of frustrating the
clear intention of a. testator, aiming, too, to make all his children
equal, upon authorities establishing a distinction-without any differ-
ence. The precise point can never arise in this state, for happily
our Statute of Wills of April 8th 1833, Pamph. L. 249, wisely
provides that the forms and solemnities of execution and proof
shall be the same in all wills, whether 0f realty or personalty. The
case before us is of a will duly executed according to the law of
Pennsylvania, devising lands in New Jersey, where, however, it
is invalid as to the realty by not having two subscribing witnesses.
A court of New Jersey might hold themselves on these authorities
bound to shut their eyes on the devise of the realty, and consider
it as though it were not written. And so they have held: .Kar-
ney v. Macomb, 1 0. E. Green 189. They might feel themselves
compelled to -say, with Lord ALVANLEY, however absurdly it
sounds: "I cannot read the will without the word- ' real' in it;
but I can say, for the statute enables me, and I am bound to say,
that if a man, by a will unattested, gives both real and personal
estate, he never meant to give the real estate :" Buckridge v.
Ingram, 2 Yes. Jr. 652. But a statute of New Jersey has no
such moral power over the conscience of a court of Pennsylvania
to prevent it from reading the whole will upon the construction
of a bequest of personalty within its rightful jurisdiction. If a
question could arise directly u'on the title of the heirs at law to
the New Jersey land, doubtless the courts of any other state, upon
the well-settled principles of the comity of nations, must decide it
"according to the lex rei sitcr. We are dealing only with the
bequest of personalty, and the simple question is, whether the
testator intended to annex a condition. If, without making
any disposition whatever of the New Jersey estates-dying intes-
tate as to them-he had annexed an express proviso to the lega-
cies to his daughters that they should release to their brothers all
their right and title as heirs at law to these lands,-it is of course
indubitable that such a condition would have been 'effectual. We
are precluded by no statute to which we owe obedience from
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reading the whole will, and, if we see plainly that such was the
intention of the testator, from carrying it into effect.
Some cases have arisen in England upon wills disposing of
English and Scotch estates, in which the judgments have not been
harmonious, nor can any general principle be extracted from them
bearing upon this question. In Brodie v. Bany, 2 Yes. & Bea.
127, an heir at law of heritable pr6perty in Scotland, being also
a legatee under a will notconforming to the law of Scotland as
to heritable property, was put to his election. By that law, a
previous conveyance by deed was necessar, according to the pro-
per feudal forms, upon which the uses declared by the will might'
operate. As by the law of Scotland th.e heir at law in such a case
was put to his approbate or reprobate (the Scotch law term for
election), and it was very similar to a will of copyhold, Sir WIL-
LIAM GRANT, considering the law of both countries to be the,
same, felt himself freed from the necessity of determining by
which law the decision should be made. .Tunda8 v. Dundas, 2
Dow & Clark 849, was a case in the House of Lords from Scot-
land. The will was formal, according to the Scotch law, but was
invalid as to real estate in England, under the Statute of Frauds.
Yet the decision of the Court of Session putting the English -heir
at law to his approbate oi reprobate, was affirmed. This case is
certainly in point in favor of the position taken in thisiL opinion.
It is true, that in the judgment pronounced by Lord Chancellor
BROUGHAm-then but recently raised to the woolsack-it is not
put on that ground. He assumes that in England, while a court
of law would be precluded by the statute from looking at the dis-
position made of the realty, it was competent for a court of equity
to do so; and that the Court of Session in Scotland hid only done
what a chancellor in England had a right to do; a distinction, it
must be allowed, not doubted in any of the previous cases, which
were all in courts of equity.
In .McCall v. McCall, Drury 283, Lord Chancellor SUGDEN
held that an heir at law of heritable property in Scotland, who
was also the devisee of real estate in Ireland, under a will duly
executed as to the Irish, but ineffectual as to the Scotch- estate,
was bound to make his election. In the late case of Maxwell v.
Xawe4l 13 Eng. L. & Eq. Rep. 443, which arose in England,
the heir at law in Scotland was not put to his election, but dis-
tinctly-on the ground that the will, in the alleged disposition of
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the Scotch estate, had used only general words. "1If the will had
mentioned Scotland in terms," said Sir KNIGHT BiucE, Lord Jus-
tice, "or the testator had not anp. real estate, except real estate
in Scotland, that might have been a ground for putting the heir
to his election. The matter, however, standing as it does, we are
bound to held that the will does not exhibit an intention to give
or affect any property which it is not adapted to pass." And
Lord CRANWORTH concurred in this view.
In this state of the authorities, we are clear in holding that we
are not precluded by force of the New Jersey Statute of Frauds
from reading the whole will of the testator in order to ascertain
his intention in reference to the bequests of personalty now in
question. We are equally clear that it is a case of election. The
intention of the testator does not rest merely upon the implication
arising from his careful division of his property among his child-
ren in different classes, but he has indicated it in words by the
clause, "I direct and enjoin on my heirs that no exception be
taken to this my will or any part thereof on any legal or techni-
cal account." It is true that for want of a bequest over, this
provision would be regarded as in terrorem only, and would not
induce a forfeiture: Chew's Appeal, 9 Wright 228. But, as has
been often said, the equitable doctrine of .election is grounded
upon theascertained intention of the testator, and we can resort
to every part of the will to arrive at it. "The intention of the
donor or testator ought doubtless to be the polar star in such
cases," says Mr. Justice KENNEDY, "and whenever it appears
from the instrument itself conferring the benefit, with certainty
that will admit of no doubt, either by express declaration or
words that are susceptible of no other meaning, that it was the
intention of the donor or testator that the object of his bounty
should. not participate in it without -giving his assent to -everything
contained in the instrument, the donee ought not to be permitted
to claim the gift, unless.he will abide by the.intention and wishes
of its author:" City] of Philade4hia v. Davis, 1 Whart. 510.
This, however, is not the only mode in which the equity of the
case can be reached. The doctrine of equitable election rests
upon the principle of compensation; and not of forfeiture, which
applies only to the non-performance of an express condition:
2 MAadd. Ch. 49. Besides, no decree of this court could authorize.
the guardians of the minors td execute releases of their right and
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title to the New Jersey land which would be effectual in that state.
The alternative decree prayed for in the bill is that which is most
appropriate to the case.
Decree reversed; and decree entered that the executors
of F. A. Vai Dyke, deceased, shall pay to the defend-
ants such sum less than the amount of their respective
legacies as will compensate the plaintiffs for the value
of the shares of the said legatees in the said real estate
in New Jersey; and that it b6 referred to a master to
settle and report such respective amounts.
The English Statute of Frauds re-
quired that a will of lands should be ex-
ecuted in the presence of three subscrib-
ing witnesses, or else "be utterly void
and of none effect." In construing
this statute, the courts have laid down
two principles, which seem to be almost
identical, but yet are susceptible of very
widely different application.
I. That, since every man is presumed
to know the law, .vhere a testator de-
vised lands by a will not executed and
attested as required by the statute, he
never intended to have the devise take
effect: Buckridge v. Ingran, 2 Ves. 652.
2. That, since the law required a devise
of lands to be proved by evidence of a
certain character and solemnity, the
courts were precluded from taking no-
tice of the devise unless the 'proper evi-
dence of it were produced. Or, in
other words, they could net read the will:
Telluson v. Woodford, 13 Ves. Jr. 209.
+ The first of these principles is founded
on a maxim which is not true in fact,
and which, in cases of wills, is not
brought into operation. The rules of
construction applied to wills are much
less strict thaa those applied to deeds,
because testators are frequently inopes
consilii, and ignorant of the law, and
this has been so from a very early pe-
riod. Executory devises have been
supported, where as remainders they
would have fallen ; and words are suf-
ficient to pass an estate of inheritance,
if used in a will, which, if found in a
deed, would create only a life estate.
Certainly, then, nothing could be more
absurd than, upon the strength of such
a maxim, to say that a testator did not
mean what he has solemnly and clearly
expressed in writing as the last act of
his life, because he has omitted to have
the required number of witnesses who
subscribed their names as such, or some
other technical and formal requisite.
2. The second principle above men-
tioned reduces the matter to a question
of evidence. Where the will is so exe-
cuted and attested as to be properly re-
ceived and read in evidence before the
court, it has never been doubted that
those who receive benefits thereby will
be held to give effect to every part
thereof. Now, a writing could have
been received in evidence by the court
when considering a contract or a be-
quest relating to personalty, which was
not sufficient evidence to affect real es-
tate under the statute: and, once in
evidence, every part of it might cer-
tainly be looked at in arriving at the in-
tention of the framer of it as to the mat-
ter in hand, i. e. the personal property.
The anomaly in the English law,'
which has been followed in this country,
and which is exposed and overruled
in the foregoing decision, was intro-
duced by Lord HAxRDwicx in 1749'
in Hearl v. Greenban, 1 Yes. Sr. 298,
where he seems to have been led away
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by the Tery strong and positive words
of the statute. "utterly void and of
none effect," and to have given his de-
cision of the point without fully exam-
ining, and certainly without fully stating,
the reasons upon which he grounded it.
In the following year, 1750, the same
chancellor decided the case of Boughton
v. Boughton, 2 Ves. Sr. 12, which was
also a question of election arising upon
a will not sufficiently attested, and there
he undertook to give the reasons for his
judgment in Bearl v. Greenbank; and
drew the distinction between an express
condition that those claiming benefit by
the will should suffer the whole ,of it io
take effect, and a similar condition im-
plied from the evident intention of the
testator. "If there is suell a condition
(express) annexed to a personal le-
gacy, the court must consider every part
of that, whether it is a matter relating
to real estate or not. You must read
the whole will relating to the personal
legacy, let it relate to what it will ;
which is a substantial difference, andwill
prevent going too far to break in upon
the Statute of Frauds, and at the same
time will attain natural justice, which
requires, as far as may be, such a con-
struction to be made, otherwise the in-
tent of the testator may be overturned."
It is to be regretted that the laws of
evidence in states bordering upon each
other should be so widely different as to
give rise to cases like Van D ke v. Van
Dyke. The statute of New Jersey re-
quires two subscribing witnesses to a
will-that of Maryland three-and in the
intermediate state of Pennsylvania a
will is good without any subscribing
witness at all. E. C. M.
United States District Court. District of New Jersey.
In. Admiralty.
ALONZO JACKSON ET AL., LIBELLANXS, v. STEAM PROPELLER
KINNIE.
State statutes authorizing actions in rein against vessels for causes cognisable in
admiralty are statutes conferring admiralty jurisdiction, and are therefore un-
constitutional.
A lien created by a state law against a domestic vessel for supplies furnished ih
a home port cannot be recognised or enforced in a court of admiralty.
THis was a libel for seamen's wages. The Hoboken Coal
Company, intervening for their own interest, contested the libel-
lants' demands, and claimed to have a lien upon the vessel for
supplies furnished. A reference was made to a commissioner to
hear the proofs and allegations of the parties.
Hamilton and Wallis, for libellants.
Jonathan Dixon, Jr., for intervenors.
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FIELD, D. J.-It is insisted by the libellants that the Hoboken
Coal Company have no standing in court, that they have no lien
upon this vessel which a court of admiralty will recognise or
enforce, and that consequently they have no right to intervene
for their own interest, or to contest the claims of the libellants.
It is admitted that the propeller was owned in this state, that
the intervenors were a corporation organized and carrying on
business. in this state, and that the supplies were furnished in this
state. It is a case then of a domestic vessel, and supplies fur-
nished in a home port. By the maritime law of continental
E.urope, no distinction is made between the cases of domestic and
foreign ships, nor between supplies furnished in a home port and
abroad. . But by the maritime law of England and of this country,
supplies furnished to a domestic vessel, in a home port, are pre-
sumed to be furnished' on the personal credit of the owner or
master, and do not create a lien, which- can be enforced in a court
of admiralty by proceedings in rem.
But the intervenors claim to have a lien upon this vessel, in
virtue of an Act of the Legislature of New Jersey, approved
MIarch 20th 1857. The title of the act is, " An act for the col-
lection of demands against ships, steamboats, and other vessels :"
4 Nixon's Dig. 576. The act, with the supplement thereto,
approved Mlarch 18th 1858, provides that, " Whenever a debt
amounting to $50 or upwards shall be contracted by the master,
owner, agent, or consignees of any ship or vessel within this
state, for either of the following purposes, namely, on account
of any work done, or, materials or articles fuinished in this state,
for or towards the building, repairing, fitting, furnishing, or
equipping such ship or vessel, or for wharfage and the expenses
of keeping such vessel in port, including the expense incurred in
employing persons to watch her, such debt shall be a lien upon
such ship or vessel, her tackle, apparel, and furniture, and shall
be preferred to all other liens thereon, except mariners' wages."
The act then proceeds to make provision for enforcing this lien.
Application may be made to a Supreme Court commissioner for a
warrant, to be directed to the sheriff, or a constable, or in their
absence, to any coroner of the county, commanding him to at.tach,
seize, and safely keep said ship or vessel to answer such lien.
Notice of the issuing of the warrant is to be published in a news-
paper printed in the county, and unless the lien is satisfied, or
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the warrant discharged, the ship or vessel is .to be sold, and the
proceeds to be distributed in the manner directed by the act.
Is this Act of the Legislature of New Jersey, so far as it
authorizes proceedings in rem against a ship or vessel, in viola-
tion of the Constitution of the United States; and is the lien
thereby attempted to be created one which a court of admiralty
will recognise or enforce ? The Constitution declares, in the 2d
section of the 3d article, among other things, that the judicial
power of the United States shall extend "to all cases of admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction." And the 9th section of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that the District Courts of the
United States shall have eiclusive original jurisdiction of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; saving to suitors,
in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the com-
mon law is competent to give it. It will *be seen, therefore, that
the jurisdiction of the District Courts.of the United States, over
all admiralty and maritime causes, is exclusive, with the exception
of such concurrent remedy as is given by the common law.
There is eminent wisdom and propriety in giving to the courts
(f the United States exclusive jurisdiction in such cases. "The
-most bigoted idolizers of state authority," said the Federalist,
"have notthus far shown a disposition to deny the national judi-
ciary the cognisance of maritime causes. These so generally
depend on the law of nations, and so commonly'affect the rights
of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are
relative to the public peace:" The Federalist, No. 80.
"The admiralty jurisdiction," says Judge STORY, "naturally
connects itself, on the one hand, with our diplomatic relations and
duties to foreign nations and their subjects; and, on the other
hand, with the great interests of navigation and commerce, foreign
and domestic. There is, then, a peculiar wisdom in giving to the
National Government a jurisdiction of this sort, which cannot be
wielded except for the general good, and which multiplies the
securities for the public peace abroad, and gives to commerce and
navigation the most encouraging support at home :" 3 Story
Con. 533.
That these cases, intended to be provided for by the act under
consideration, are maritime eontracets, and therefore "civil causes
of admiralty and 'Maritime jurisdiction," there can be no doubt:
:A. Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. R. 474; Dunlap's Admiralty Pr. 43.
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They are therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Dis-
trict Courts of the United States.
This question has been repeatedly decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Statutes, similar in every respect
to that of New Jersey, have been enacted in most of the states;
and whenever they have come under the consideration of the
Supremg Court they have been held to be unconstitutional and 
void, so far at least as they authorize proceedings in rem. Thus,
in the case of The Moses Taylor, 4 Wallace 411, it was held that
a statute of California, which authorizes actions in rem against
vessels -for causes of action cognisable in admiralty, to that extent
attempts to invest her courts with admiralty jurisdiction, and is
therefore' unconstitutional. "The action against the steamer by
name," say the court, "authorized by the statute of California,
is a proceeding in the nature and with the incidents of a suit in
admiralty. The distinguishing and characteristic feature of such
suit is that the vessel or thing proceeded against is itself seized
and impleaded as the defendant, and is judged Jand sentenced
accordingly. It is 'this dominion of the suit in admiralty over
the vessel or thing itself which gives to the title made under its
decrees validity against, all the world." And in the case of The
Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wallace 555, where a similar statute of Iowa
was under consideration, the court held that state statutes, which
attempt to confer uppn state courts a remedy for marine torts and
marine contracts by proceedings strictly in rem, are void. In
this case it was contended that the statute of Iowa might fairly
be construed as coming within the clause of the 9th section of the
Judiciary Act, which "saves to suitors, in all cases, the right of a
common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give
it." But the court say the remedy prescribed by the statute is
in no sense a common-law remedy. It is a remedy pattaking of
all the essential features of an admiralty proceeding in rem. The
statute provides that the vessel may be sued and made defendant
without any proceeding against the owners, or even mentioning
their names. And while the proceeding differs thus from a com--
mon-law remedy, it is also essentially different from what are
called suits by attachment. In these cases there is a suit against
a personal defendant by name, but because of. inability to serve
process on him, on account of non-residence or some other reason,
the suit is commenced by a writ, directing the proper officer to
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attach sunficient property of the defendant to answer any judg-
ment which may be rendered against him.
But, besides these decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, we have a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of New
York, in a case involving the constitutionality of a statute of that
state, precisely similar to our own, from which in fact our statute
was copied. It is the case of Bird et al. v. The Steamboat
Josepine. It has not yet been officially reported, but it was
published in the New York Transcript of November 5th 1868.
The court decided that the proceeding authorized by their statute
against a vessel by name was a proceeding in the nature, and with
all the incidents, of a suit in admiralty; that such a proceeding
could not be sustained; and that the statute itself was uncon-
stitutional.
It is pleasant to find this concert and harmony of opinion
between the Court of Appeals of the state of New York and the
Supreme Court of the United States, upon a question of con-
flicting jurisdiition between state and Federal courts.. But it is insisted, that although the statute of New Jersey may
be unconstitutional, so far as it authorizes proceedings in rem
against a ship or vessel for a breach of maritime contract, yet it
nevertheless creates a lien upon such vessel, which a Court of
Admiralty will recognise and enforce. There was a time when
such an argument might have been successfully urged. The
effect of such statutes undoubtedly is, to assimilate our law to
that of continental Europe, or, in the language of Chief Justice
WATKITS, in .H'errick v. Avery, 14 Ark. 378, "to extend the
privilege of the maritime lien upon sea-going vessels for their
building or equipment in domestic ports, just as that lien existed
in Europe, and would have prevailed in England, and so descended
to this .counatry, but for the jealousy of the common law." And
it is undoubtedly true, that, for many years, the Supreme Court
of -the United States, by repeated decisions, held, that these liens
thus created by local law might be enforced by proceedings in rem
in the District Court; and that in 1844 they adopted a rule,
expressly authorizing the process in rem where the party was
entitled to a lien under the local or state law. But it is equally
true that this rule has since been abrogated, and that such liens
can no longer be enforced by proceedings in ren in the District
Court.
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Chief Justice TANEY, in'delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court in the case of The Steamer St. Lawrence, 1 Black 522,
gave a brief but lucid history of the legislation of Congress upon
this subject, of the course of decisions by the Supreme Court,
and of the reasons which led to the adoption of the 12th rule, in
the first instance, and its subsequent repeal.
After the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress
passed the act prescribing the process to be used in the different
courts it had established; and by that act directed that, in the
courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the forms and modes
of proceedings should be according to the course of the civil law.
This act left no discretionary power in the Admiralty Courts, or
in the Supreme Court, in relation to the modes and forms of pro-
ceeding. But this.difficulty was soon seen and removed, and by
the Act of May 8th 1792, these forms and modes of proceeding
are to be according to the principles, rules, and usages which
belong to courts of admiralty, as contradistinguished from courts
of common law; and are made subject to such alterations and
additions as the respective courts might deem expedient, "or to
such regulations as the Supreme Court of the United States shall
think proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to any Cir-
cuit or District Court concerning the same." And the power
here conferred upon the Supreme Court was afterwards enlarged
by the Act of August 23d 1842. It was under the authority of
these two acts that the 12th rule, to which we have referred, was
made in 1844, and afterwards altered by the rule adopted in De-
cember 1858. In the mean time, by a series of decisions in the
Supreme Court, it had been held, that where liens had been given
by the local law, the party was entitled to proceed in rem in the
Admiralty Court to' enforce it: The General Smith, 4 Wheat.
438; Peyrouse v. Howard, 7 Pet. 324; The New Orleans v.
P iebus, 11 Id. 175. When the rules, then, were framed in 1844,
in conformity to the practice thus adopted, it was provided by the
12th rule, that, "In all suits by material-men for supplies or
repairs or other necessaries for a foreign ship, or for a ship in a'-
foreign port, the libellant may proceed against the ship and
freight in rem, or against the master, or the owner alone, in per-
sonam; and the like proceedings in rem shall apply to cases of
domestic ships, where, by the local law, a lien is given to material-
men for supplies, repairs, or other necessaries." Now, there.
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would have been no embarrassing difficulties in thus using the
ordinary process, in rem, of the civil law, if the state law had
given the lien in general terms, without specific conditions or
limitations inconsistent with the rules and principles which
governed implied maritime liens. On the contrary, such process
would have promoted the convenience and facilities of trade and
navigation by the promptness of its proceedings, and would have
disposed at once of the whole controversy, without subjecting'
the party to the costs and delay of a proceeding in the chan-
cery or common-law courts of the state to obtain the benefit of
his lien.
Iii many of the states, however, it was soon discovered that
these laws, by which liens were thus created, did not harmonize
with the principles and rules of the maritime code. Certain con-
ditions and limitations were annexed to them; and these condi-
tions and limitations differed in different states; and it became
manifest that if the process in rem was to be plsed wherever the
local law gave the lien, it would subject the Admiralty Court to
the necessity of examining and expounding the varying laws of
every state, and of carrying them into execution, and that, too,
in controversies where the existence of the lien was denied, and
the -right depended altogether on a disputed construction of a state
statute, or, indeed, in some cases of conflicting claims, under
statutes of different states, when the vessel had formerly belonged
to the port of Another state, and had become subject to a lien by
the state law. Such duties and powers are appropriate to the
courts of the state which created .the lien, but are entirely alien
to the purposes for which the admiralty power was created, and
form no part of the code of laws which it was designed to
administer.
The proceeding, therefore, in rem, upon the ground that the
local law gave the lien where none was given -by the maritime
codei was found upon experience to be inapplicable to our own
mixed form of government. It was found to be inconvenient in
most cases and absolutely impracticable in others; and the rule
which sanctioned it was therefore repealed. The repealing rule
provides that, "In all suits by material-men for sUpplies or repairs
or other necessaries for a foreign ship, or for a ship in a foreign
port, the libellant may proceed against the ship and freight in
rem, or against the master or owner alone in personam. And the
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like proceedings in p2rsonam, but not in rem, shall apply to cases
of domestic ships for supplies, repairs, or other necessaries."
The consequence is, that in cases of domestic ships, for sup-
plies furnished at a home port, a lien created by a state law is
one which a court of admiralty can neither recognise nor
enforce.
Hence it follows, that in this case, The Hoboken Coal Company
have no standing in court, have no right to intervene, either for
their own interest or to contest the claims of the libellants, and
that the testimony taken on their behalf must be stricken out.
Let judgment be entered in favor of the libellants, with costs as
against the intervenors.
Supreme Court of Tennessee.
R. A. GRAHAM v. MERRILL ET AL.
When the United States forces, during the late war, acquired firm occupation
of part of an insurrectionary state, the citizens of that part so occupied were
restored to their relations as citizens of the United States, and contracts between
them and other citizens became valid.
The Act of July 13th 1861, and the Proclamation of the President of August
16th. 1861, authorized, 1. Unrestricted commercial intercourse between the citi-
zens of loyal states and of those parts of insurgent states in occupation of tie
Federal forces ; and 2. Intercourse between citizens of the loyal and insurgent
states, subject to the license of the President and the regulations prescribed by
the Secretary of the Treasury; and the President's order of February 28th 1862
was a general license to such intercourse. But by the President's Proclamation
of March 31st 1863, the distinction was abolished, and all intercourse between
the citizens of loyal and insurgentstates was made subject to license by the
President and the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury.
It was not necessary to the lawfulness of such intercourse that the party engag-
ing in it should have a special license to himself by name under the President's
own sign manual. The President's power to license might be delegated or might
be exercised by ageneral proclamation, such as those of February 28th 1862 and
March 31st 1863.
APPEAL from decree of the Chancellor overruling demurrer to
complaint.
On May 24th 1864, Graham, a citizen of New York, on the
one side, and Merrill and Cliffe, citizens of Williamson county,
Tennessee, on the other, entered into articles of'partnership to
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engage in the business of buying and selling cotton. The place
where the partners contemplated and agreed to buy cotton, was
in that portion of the state of Tennessee within the military
lines of and held in firm occupation by the national army. Cot-
ton so bought, the- articles stipulated, should be sent to and sold
in the city of New York. At the time of making the contract,
Graham had a license or permit from "the proper officer of the
Government of the United States" to engage in the contemplated
trade, and so informed Merrill and Cliffe. It was contemplated
and agreed that the trade should be carried on "in strict con-
formity with the laws and regulations of the United States,
regulating commercial intercourse" between the loyal and insur-
rectionary states. Graham furnished Merrill and Cliffe with large
sums of money, and they bought and shipped to him much cotton,
the proceeds of sales of which fell largely short of the money
furnished.
The articles stipulated that each party was to have one-half
the net profits, and to bear one-talf the losses.
This was a bill for an account and contribution.
H. G. SmITH, J.-At the time of the making of the contract,
the enemy relation did not subsist between the parties; and,
therefore, they had the capacity to contract together, and their
contract is not void by reason of enemy relation. •
The national army had firm occupation of the country of the
residence of Merrill and Cliffe. Such occupation established the
dominion and government of the United States over that country,
and restored the inhabitants to -the relation of citizens of the
United States. The previous enemy relation between the parties
to. the contract was thus ended, and their incapacity to contract
with each other, by reason of their previous .enemy relation, was
also ended: The V enice, 2 Wall. 277; The Ouachita Cotton, 6 Id.
531;
It is another question, whether the subject-matter of the con-
tract was lawful; a contract for commercial intercourse between
a loyal state -and a part of an insurrectionary state. If such
trade was unlawful the contract was illegal and void. Generally,
commercial intercourse between the loyal and disloyal states
during the war of the Rebellion was unlawful. It was so made
by the Act of Congress of July 13th 1861 (12 St. at Large 251),
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and by the several proclamations of the President in conformity
with the act, and also probably by the laws of war. But though
generally prohibited as to all the insurrectionary states, excep-
tions were authorized by the Act of Congress and the proclama-
tions of the President. Under the proclamations of August 16th
1861 (12 Statutes at Large 1262), unrestricted trade was author-
ized between the loyal states and such parts of the insurrectionary
states as " from time to time should be occupied and controlled
by the national forces engaged in the dispersion of 'the insur-
gents." Trade, also, was authorized between the loyal states
and the disloyal states, by virtue of license granted by the Presi-
deiit, and through and under regulations and restrictions pre-
scribed by the Secretary of the' Treasury and approved by the
President. Such license was granted by the President, by
order of date February 28th.1862, which recites: "1 Considering
that the existing circumstances of the country allow a partial
restoration of commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of
those parts of the United States heretofore declared to be in
insurrection, and the citizens of the loyal states of the Union,
and exercising the authority and discretion confided to me by the
Act of Congress approved July 13th 1861, entitled 'An Act to
provide for the collection of duties on imports and for other pur-
poses,' I do hereby license and permit such commercial inter-
course, in all cases within the rules and regulations which have
been or may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury for
the conducting and cirrying on of the same, on the inland waters
and ways of the United States."
Intercourse' thus authorized and regulated, continued until
March 31st 1863. On that day the President issued a further
proclamation in regard to commercial intercourse between the
loyal and disloyal states. The change made by that proclama-
tion was to prohibit the unrestricted trade between the loyal
states and the parts of disloyal states held and occupied by the
national forces, which was authorized by the original proclama-
tion. Such parts of the disloyal states were placed on the same
footing as to trade asthe residue and unoccupied parts of the dis-
loyal states. The whole insurrectionary country was placed in
the same condition, as to commercial inteicourse with the loyal
states. All were prohibited, except under license granted by the
President "through the Secretary of the Treasury," and regula.
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tions prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury and approved
by the President. But trade, in conformity with such license and
regulations, was lawful in whatsoever part of the insurrectionary
country it was carried on: The Venice, 2 Wall. 278.
The contract between the parties here was made after the pro-
clamation of the President of March 31st 1863, and is therefore
dependent, as to the validity of the trade agreed on, upon the
condition of the law as it then was, by virtue of the Act of Con-
gress and the proclamation last mentioned. The fact that the
trade contemplated was between a loyal state and part of an insur-
rectionary state in the firm occupation of the national forces, does
not seem to be of vital, if even of material consequence. Tht
nfilitary occupation of the countiy, wherein the cotton was to be
bought, does not appear to give the trade any lawful quality,
other than it would have in a region of country not so occupied.
It is thus apparent that there was a trade which might be lawfully
carried on between inhabitants of the insurrectionary country
and residents of the loyal states. Such trade the parties in this
case agreed to engage in. It follows that their contract to en-
gage in such trade was lawful..
It was not necessary to the. legality of the trade that the party
engaging in it should have a special license to himself by name,
from the President himself, under his sign manual. A fair con-
struction of the Act of Congress of July 13th 1861, does not
exact that the trade which the President, under the regulations
of the Secretary of the Treasury, was aiithorized to license,
should be carried on by special and individual licenses, under his
sign manual. And such was not the practice at the time. Nor
was it the construction put upon the act at the time by the Presi-
dent and Secretary of the Treasury, who were charged by the
act with the duty and authority to allow trade, that the license
must be issued by the President, directly to the individual licensed,
or.by authority of the President granted by himself in each par-
ticular case, upon his discretion exercised in each particular case,
as to the individual to whom the grant of license was to be made.
The act authorizes the President in his diseretion to license and
allow the trade. Nothing in it exacts, as of necessity, that the
discretion was not in any manner or to any extent delegable. On
the contrary, the fact that the trade licensed was to be conducted
in pursuance of regulations made by the Secretary of the Trea-
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sury, indicates that it was not intended to restrict the trade to
individual instances designated in each particular case by the Pre-
sident himself, but to allow a trade in some measure of more
general character, in conformity with general regulations pre-
scribed for its government. That was the construction put upon
the act by the President and Secretary. And in conformity with
such construction, persons embarked in the trade, and; indeed,
whole communities, whbefn brought within the dominion of the
sovereign government by the military forces. A construction so
made at the time, and by the chief functionaries charged with
the execution of the Act of Congress, ought not now to be de-
parted from, unless for very cogent reasons. Such reasons are
not apparent to this court.
The President repeatedly exercised his discretion and granted
license to trade. This was done by the order of February 28th
1862, already recited. It was further done by his order of March
81st 1863, accompanying and approving the regulations of that
date, issued by the Secretary of the Treasury. The order or-
license recites "that it appears that a partial restoration of inter-
course between the inhabitants of sundry places and sections here-
tofore declared in insurrection, and the citizens of the rest of the.
United States, will favorably affect the public interest; therefore-
the President, exercising the discretion and authority confided to,
him by the Act of July 18th 1861, hereby doth license and per-
mit such commercial intercourse between the citizens of the loyal.
states and the inhabitant.s of the. insurrectionary states, in the-
cases aud under the restrictions described and expressed by- the-
regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, of even date with
the order," to wit, March 81st 1863.
A license to trade with the enemy in time of war is said to. be.
stricti juris. By this is meant, in its ordinary application, that-
the license granted to the person is to be construed strictly, as to
the extent of the power granted to him by it; in respect to the
manner in which he may exercise it; the objects in which he may
trade; the person with whom he may deal; the times and circum-
stances in which he may exercise the power; the good faith on
his part in his use of it; the inability to transfer it to others or
enable others to trade under it, and many other circumstances
touching the construction and exercise of the authority granted,
by the license. But we are not aware of any principle or autho-
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rity which applies the like doctrine to the power of the sovereign
or commander-in-chief of the army and navy, or to other public
functionary, authorized by the public law or statutory law, to issue
or grant license to trade with the enemy in time of war. "In
respect to the authority granted to the public functionary to
authorize such trade, the ordinary principles of construction are
properly applicable. And when the authorized officer of the
government has exercised the power, and the citizens of the
government have largely acted under the authority, confiding in
the .validity of its exercise, no good reason is obvious, but on the
contrary, much reason is manifest why the citizens so confiding
shall not have illegality imputed to their transactions under it.
It is not to be doubted that trade authorized and conducted
under the license of the President, so granted, and in conformity
with the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, is not to
be deemed illegal.
Decree affirmed.
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
KANE AND WIFE v. McOARTHY AND WIFE ET AL.
-Any woman, being a free white person, and an alien friend, married after the
.-approval of the Act of February 10th 1855, to a man who was, at the time of
-such marriage, a naturalized citizen of the United States, becomes, by such max
riage, ipsofacto, herself a citizen of the Onited States, and capable of inheriting
,real estate, although she resided in a foreign country at the time of hersaid mar-
riage, and has continued her actual residence there ever since.
And any alien woman answering the above description, and married before the
approval of the said act, to an alien husband, who has been subsequently natur-
alized, becomes by his naturalization, ipso facto, herself a citizen of the United
!States, and capable of inheriting real estate.
It is the status of being married to-being the wife of-a citizen, which makes
,the alien woman a citizen of the United States.
"THIS was an action for the partition of Certain real estate in
rthe city of Raleigh.
The facts of the case were as follows: John Kane, who was a
-native of Ireland, but a naturalized citizen of the United States,
resident in the city of Raleigh, being seised of certain real estate
in said city, died intestate May 20th 1868. The decedent left no
lineal descendants. At the date of his decease all his collateral
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relations were aliens, who could not inherit according to the law
of North Carolina, 6xcept the femes coverts and infants, parties to
the suit, who all claimed to be citizens of the United States, and
therefore capable of inheriting.
The plaintiff Martha Kane was a sister of John Kane, a free
white woman, and a native of Ireland, where she had always
resided until after the said John Kane's death, and she was never
in the United States, until she came here in 1867 to institute this
action; but on the 28th day of November 1857, being of full age,
she married the plaintiff Thomas Kane, her cousin, who was, at
the date of said marriage, a naturalized citizen of the United
States, and had resided therein from 1848 to 1857, when he re-
turned to Ireland, after having been lawfully naturalized in the
state of New York in October 1855.
Both the plaintiffs, after their marriage, remained in Ireland
until after John Kane's death, having, however, always the inten-
tion of eventually removing to the United States; and in 1867,
the plaintiff Martha came to this country to institute this action,
leaving her husband still in Ireland.
The defendant Mary McCarthy was also a sister of John
Kane, a free white woman and a native of Ireland: she immi-
grated into the United States during her iiifancy, in the year
1850, and continued to reside therein ever after. In May 1851
she intermarried with the defendant Dennis McCarthy, an Irish-
man, who landed in the United States on the 12th of March
1850, and has resided here ever since, having been lawfully natur-
alized in the state of New Jersey in October 1856.
The infant defendants, Thomas Patrick McCarthy and Isabella
McCarthy, were the'children of Dennis and Mary McCarthy,
were both born in the state of New Jersey, and have resided there
ever since their birth;. and, since 1865, these infants had been in
the pernancy of the rents of the real estate described in the
pleadings.
The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Superior Court of
Wake county, setting forth the above facts, claiming one-half of
the real estate, in right of the plaintiff Martha, as one of the
heirs "of John Kane, admitting that the infant defendants were
entitled to the other half, as the other heirs of the said John
Kane, alleging further, that the said infant defendants claimed
the whdle of said real estate, and that the defendants Dennis and
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Mary McCarthy, in right of said Mary, also set up an unfounded
claim to the whole of the said real estate, and demanded judg-
ment of partition and an account of the rents and profits.
The defendants demurred, "because "it appears upon the face
of the complaint, that the facts therein stated are not sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, and to entitle the plaintiffs to the
judgment which they demand."
The court gave judgment on the demurrer for the defendants,
and thereupon the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.
-Ed. Graham Hfaywood, for plaintiffs.-lst. By virtue of the
2d section of the Act of Congress of the 10th of February 1855,
Martha Kane was, at the time of descent cast, a citizen of the
United States, and capable of inheriting to her brother John.
It is admitted that Martha Kane is a woman who has married
a naturalized citizen of the United States since the act, the only
question is, was she, at the date of her marriage, "a woman who
might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws." The
auxiliary verb "may," in all its forms, has a potential meaning;
it is used to express, not what is, but what is possi ble; and this
expression, according to its natural interpretatioh,.is equivalent
to, any woman for whom, by the laws extant in 1855, naturaliza-
tion was or is possible; in other words, any woman who, by the
laws in force in 1855, was or is capable of becoming a citizen of
the United States through the process of naturalization as then
regulated by law.
2d. To ascertain who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws, we refer to the Naturalization Act of 1802, and
find that "any alien being a free white person, provided that he
or she is not an alien enemy," is capable of becoming a citizen of
the United States by the process of naturalization: 10 Stats. at
Large, ch. 71, p. 604 ; 1 Bright. Dig. of Laws, tit. Citizenship,
p. 132, and tit. Alien, p. 73; 2 Kent's Com. (ed. of 1867, by
G. F. Comstock), p. 15 n., and p. 36; 1 Scrib. on Dower, from
p. 174 to p. 176, and pp. 144 and 147; 2 Am. Law Reg. (0. S.)
p. 193; Burton v. Burton, 8 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) p. 425;
26 How. Prac. Rep. p. 474; Greer v. Bankston, 2G How. "Prac.
Rep. p. 471; L'udlam v. -Ludla, 81 Barb. (N. Y.) p. 486;
affirmed in the Court of Appeals, 26 N. Y. Rep.; also 3 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S.) pp. 595 and 599.
KA1NE v. McCARTHY.
3d. The Act of 1855 was not intended to provide a new process
of naturalization for alien women and children, as is apparent
from its title and whole purview and meaning; it was enacted to
define and regulate the legal status as to citizenship of foreign:
born wives and children of United States citizens, and to identify
them in citizenship with the father and husband, without any pro-
cess of naturalization. Its main object was to dispense with the,
process of naturalization in cases coming within its operation.
4th. To allow the words "who might lawfully be naturalized
under the existing laws," the effect of compelling an alien woman
to use the whole process of naturalization, except the final step
of admission by acompetent court of record, before she becomes
a citizen by reason f the fact that she is the wife of a citizen of
the United States, is to permit this single sentence to defeat the
whole policy, purpose, and scope of the act.
W. H. Battle, for infant defendants.-By the laws of the
United States, the following are indispensable requisites to
naturalization. 1st. Five years' residence; 2d. Proof of good
character; 3d. Renouncing title of nobility; 4th. Not being an
alien enemy. Martha Kane was a native of Ireland and had
always resided there; what was her character does not appear, the
only requisite she had was that of being a white woman. Is that
alone sufficient ?
Residence here was a sine qua non to being naturalized. Act
of 1802 required five years' residence, proof of good moral
character, and attachment to the Constitution. Act of March
1813 required five years' residence. Act of March 1816 re-
quired the same. Act of May 1824 required five years' resi-
dence even for minors. Act of 1828 required five years' continued
residence and particular proof of it. Act of 1848 only strikes
out the clause, "without being at any time within the said five
years out of the territory of the United States," which was in the
Act of 1813, still leaving a five years' residence to be necessary.
It will thus be seen that all the acts insist upon residence as an
indispensable requisite to naturalization, without repeating the
clause which requires proof of character.
An alien fenze covert may be naturalized: see E parte Pie, 1
Cranch, .Cir. Co. Rep. 372; and she must be naturalized before
she can claim dower: see 1 Cruise Dig., tit. Dower, chap.
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1, sect. 29 and 30; Smith on Real and Per. Property, p. 296;
Paul v. Ward, 4 Dev. 247.
Compare our act with the 7 & 8 Vict. ch. 66, sect. 16,
and it will be seen that ours is a copy of it, with the additional
words, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing
laws." The British statute reads thus: "Any woman, married,
or who shall be married to a natural born subject, or person natur-
alized, shall be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, and
have all the rights and privileges of a natural born subject :" see
-Regina v. Manning, 66 Eng. Com. Law Rep. p. 886.
.. _. Phillips and B. 1H. Battle, Jr., for~the adult defend-
ants.-In 1863, at the death of John Kane,*Mary McCarthy his
sister, being a person who, under existing laws, might be natural-
ized, and being the wife of a citizen of the United States, was
herself a citizen, and so is an heir of John Kane.
If she be an heir, she is so to the exclusion of her children, the
defendants Francis P. and Isabella McCarthy.
In 1863, at John Kane's death, his sister Martha Kane, though
the wife of a citizen of the United States, was not a woman who
might be naturalized, and could not be John Kane's heir.
The words "who might be naturalized" mean one who iR in a
condition to be naturalized under existing laws, and the intent of
the act must have been to dispense with the usual forms attending
the process of naturalization in case of marriage to a citizen. In
such case, omission by the wife to go through theforms of natural-
ization (and naturalization of a woman by the courts is of rare
occurrence) is cured by her being married to a citizen. That the
woman should be a resident, and subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States, must be required.
As to the question of residence, the policy of the legislation of
the United States, is apparent by reference to the words of Mr.
Webster's bill of 1848, in which the words "and shall continue to
reside therein," show that residence in the country was presumed
as a necessity of citizenship.
Who might be naturalized, cannot be a periphrasis for free
white woman. Reference is made in the 1st section of the act
to the Act of 1802, in which the expressionfree white person is
used six times.
The Act of 1802 was before the draftsman, and there was no
KANE v. McCARTHY.
reason for the abandonment of an expression of certain meaning
for one intended to be synonymous but of doubtful import. Who
might be was used deliberately, and does not mean who may be.
Burton v. Burton is an authority against the plaintiff, though
the reasons given for the decision were not well considered, and
the dicta are bad as well as gratuitous.
As to the effect of. change of words in statutes, see Dwarris on
Statutes, p. 707.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PEARSON, C. J.-The right of the feme plaintiff, Martha Kane,
to *take by descent, as one of the heirs at law of John Kane,
depends upon the construction of the 2d section of the Act of
February 10th 1855.
The wording of this section is very precise, and, as it seems to
us, its meaning is too clear to leave much room for construction,
or to call for much discussion. .
What description of woman might lawfully be naturalized,
under the existing laws? That depends on the Act of 1802:
"Any alien, being a free white person, may be admitted to be-
come a citizen of the United States on the following conditions,
and not otherwise :" see. 1. And there is a proviso that the per-
son must not be an alien enemy. Martha Kane is a free white
woman, a native of Ireland, and was not an alien enemy, there-
fore she might lawfully have been naturalized under the existing
laws, and answers the description required by the section under
consideration; she was- married to a citizen of the United States
when the descent was cast, and was then herself a citizen, by
force of the Act of 1855 and takes as one of the heirs of her
brother.
But it is said that Martha Kane had no residence in the United
States before or at the time of the descent cast. That is true;
and it might be added that she never filed a declaration of inten-
tion, never took an oath to support the Constitution of the United
States, or renounced her allegiance to the Queen of Great Britain;
and there was no proof of her being a woman of good moral
character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States.
The reply is,-these are conditions which persons applying for
naturalization under the Act of 1802, are required to comply with.
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But there are no such conditions imposed by the Act of 185.5; it
only requires that the woman shall be one of such a description
as might be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and if
she answers the description, the very object of the act was to dis-
pense with all these requirements, and make her a citizen by the
mere fact of her being married to a citizen of the United States.
In other words, the wife of every citizen of the United States "is
to be deemed and taken to be a citizen," so that if a citizen mar-
ries an alien woman residing here, ipso facto she is a citizen also,
without going through the forms required by the Act of 1802 ;
or, if he marries an alien woman residing in Ireland, ipso facto
she is a citizen, and should he die without returning to the United
States, she will take dower; or, if he settles his land on her by
will or otherwise, she will take and hold. The policy of the Act
of 1855 is to identify the wife with the husband in regard to
citizenship, and thus to carry out the principles of the common
law as to the relation of "husband and wife."
Does the conclusion need confirmation ? It is furnished by the
1st section; the status of the father is made that of the child,
and on its birth, ipso facto, it is a citizen of the United States,
without residence, declaration of intention, or oath to support the
Constitution, all being dispensed with, and the only limitation is,
that if the child never comes to reside in the United States, the
right of citizenship shall not descend to his children.
And this section puts a limitation upon the descent of citizen-
ship to the children of a wife who never comes to reside in the
United States; so if her citizen husband dies, and she marries an
alien, her child by the second husband would not be a citizen, for
it is confined to children whose fathers are citizens.
On the argument, our attention was called to 7 & 8 Vict.:
"Any woman, married or who shall be married to a natural born
subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be
herself naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges of a
natural-born subject." It is clear that the Act of 1855 was taken
from this statute, and it is then asked, why change the wording,
and, instead of "any woman," use the paraphrase "any woman
who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," if
the operation of the act was to be as broad and sweeping as that
of Victoria ?
It is not seen how this can have much effect upon the argu-
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ment, but the solution is easy. The Act of 1802 does not make
any woman capable of being naturalized, so it was necessary to
make some change by adding the words "free white woman," or
some equivalent expression, and the history of parties in 1855
fully explains why this equivalent expression was adopted, instead
of "free white woman;" for at that time an angry contest was
going on in reference to the words "all men are born free and
equal," and a formidable party took the ground that the Act of
1802 "was in violation of the Declaration of Independence, in so
far as it attempted to exclude from citizenship all who were not
"free white persons." If the words "free white" had been left
out, the bill would have met with opposition from the South, and
if these words had been expressed, it would have met with oppo-
sition from the North, so the reason for adopting an expression
which leaves that question open is obvious.
Having settled the right of Martha, the right of her sister
Mary can be settled in few words.
Mary was a resident of the United States at the time of her
marriage; in this, seemingly, she has the advantage of Martha;
but her husband was not a citizen of the United States' at the
time of her marriage; in this, seeiffingly; Martha has the advan-
tage of her, but in fact they both stand on the same footing, for
it is not the ceremony of marriage, or its time or place, but it is
the fact of being "married to," that is, being the wife of a citi-
zen, that makes the woman a citizen. The circumstance that her
husband was not a citizen at the time of the marriage is wholly
immaterial, for he became a citizen afterwards; ipso facto she
being a free white woman married to a citizen, comes within the
description and the very words of the Act of Congress, and is
deemed and taken to be a citizen; for it is the status of being
married to-being the wife of a citizen, that makes her one.
It can in no possible view make any difference whether the
marriage ceremony is performed first and then the husband
becomes a citizen, or whether he becomes a citizen first, and the
marriage afterwards takes place. Wherever the two events con-.
cur and come together, she is a woman married to a citizen.
The thing seems to us too plain to admit of discussion-it is like
trying to prove that two added to two make four.
Mary is entitled to the other moiety, and the defendants, her
two children, are excluded.
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There is error, judgment reversed and judgment that plaintiff
recover one undivided moiety of the lands mentioned in the
pleadings, and that partition be made between the plaintiff Martha
and the defendant Mary.
To this end, it is referred to the clerk to inquire whether .a
sale will be necessary for the purpose of partition; and an
account will be taken of the rents and profits; the plaintiff will
have judgment for costs.
Burton v. Burton, 26 Howard's Practice Rep. 474; Ludlam v.
Ludlam, 31 Barb. 487, cited on the argument, received due con-
sideration by the court.
Since the foregoing case was decided from the syllabus, furnished us by the
the Supreme Court of the United States, Reporter (ante, p. 444), the court seems
in Kelly v. Owen, have construed the to take the same view of the act as the
same Act of Congress. We have not court in the foregoing case.
seen the full opinion (which will be J. T. AL
published in 7 Wallace) ; but, judging
Supreme Court of Alabama.
J. DUBOSE BIBB v. EVELYN POPE.
The husband and wife cannot enter into a mortgage of her statutory separate
estate for the purpose of subjecting it to sale for the payment of the husband's
debts ; and if they do, a court of chancery will not permit the mortgage to be
enforced by sale of the wife's separate estate, if she objects to it.
THE opinion of the court was delivered by
PETERS, J.-On the 5th of April 1866, Augustus Pope, the
husband of Mrs. Evelyn Pope, appellee, borrowed of J. Dubose
Bibb, appellant, the sum of $10,000, for which he gave his bill of
exchange for $I2,400, payable eight months after date, to order
of said Bibb. On the same day said Augustus Pope executed and
delivered to said Bibb a certain conveyance in writing, in the form
of a mortgage, whereby he conveyed to Bibb certain lands therein
named, which belonged to himself, and a lot numbered 57 in the
city of Montgomery in this state, which was the separate property
of his wife, said Evelyn Pope. This mortgage contained a power
to sell the land contained therein' in the event that Pope failed to
pay said bill of exchange at its maturity. Mrs. :Pope united with
her husband in this mortgage, and the same is attested by two
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witnesses. At the maturity of the bill of exchange Pope failed
to pay it, and Bibb then proceeded to advertise a sale of the
mortgaged property, for the purpose of selling the same for pay-
ment of his debt against said Augustus Pope; and included in said
advertisement the lot belonging to Mrs. Pope, as her separate
estate. Thereupon Mrs. Pope by her next friend filed her bill in
the Chancery Court of Montgomery county aforesaid against said
Bibb, and said Augustus Pope her husband, for the purpose of
enjoining and preventing said proposed sale of her said lot No.
5T. An injunction was granted her, and upon the final hearing
it was made perpetual. The bill was filed on the 23d day of
January 1867.' It appears from the bill and proofs, that B. N.
Wilkerson and his wife 'Elizabeth gave the lot in controversy to
Mrs. Pope by deed, on the 10th day of August 1860, to have and
to hold the same to her, "her heirs and assigns, to her use and
behoof for ever." Upon the hearing, the Chancellor sustained
the bill and perpetually enjoined. Bibb from selling said lot No.
57 as the separate estate of Mrs. Pope, under said mortgage, and
taxed Bibb with the costs. From this decree Bibb appeals to
this court.
The only question discussed at the bar was, whether Mrs. Pope
was bound by said mortgage, and whether her statutory separate
estate was liable to be sold under it, to pay her husband's debt
due by said bill of exchange to said Bibb. This question has not
heretofore been settled by any decision of this court. In dis-
cussing it, the court cannot close its eyes to the fact that the wife
is under the yower of the husband, and often acts, when he chooses
to invoke her aid, under an influence but little less potent than
actual duress, nor can it ignore the further fact that the law, under
the common-law system, has treated the wife in some respects as
the servant of the husband, subject to his control, even to chas-
tisement by stripes "in base of any gross misbehavior :" 1 Bl.
Com. 444, 445; 2 Kent Com. 181. She has been placed very
much upon the footing of a child during its minority. She has
had no voice in any one of the great departments of the govern-
ment; no voice at the ballot-box; no -voice on the jury. She
rarely deals with the husband, nor, where he is interested, upon
equal terms with him. These circumstances have rendered her,
of late years, the peculiar object of legislative solicitude and pro-
tection. The law-making wisdom of the state has seen and felt
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h,- iced of greater protection than the common law afforded, and
h -,s ievised, under various titles, "laws for the protection of the
rich's of married women." Thus far such laws have recommended
themselves so strongly to public favor, that, to secure them from
repeal and fluctuation, they have been inmany instances incorpo-
rated into the fundamental law of the'state. And we think it
safe to say that the declared and manifest purpose of such enact-
ments furnishes a just rule for their interpretation. They were
made to avoid the known insecurity to which the estates of mar-
ried women are exposed, from the improvidence or maladministra-
tion of the husband, who necessarily exercises so.large a control
over the wife, and through her over her estate.
The Code of 1853, which is copied into the Revised Code of
this state, and which latter code, with certain modifications, is now
the law that must govern the judgments of this tribunal, declares
that "all the property of the wife, held by her previous to the
marriage, or which she may become entitled to after the marriage
in any manner, is the separate estate of the wife, and is not subject
to the payment of the debts of the husband." And another sec-
tion of the same law vests in the husband, as the trustee of the
wife, her separate estate; and gives him the control and disposi-
tion of the "rents, income, anti profits- thereof, but such rents,
income, and property are not subject to the payment of the debts
of the husband:" Rev. Code, §§ 2371, 2372; Patteison v. Flana-
gan, 37 Ala. 513.
The bill in this case is filed by the wife, Mrs. Pope, to prevent
the sale of her separate estate for the payment of the debt of her
husband, Augustus Pope--a thing which the statute declares shall
not be done. If, then, this sale is permitted, the whole purpose
of the law, so far as it protects the wife's separate estate, will be
defeated, for when the principle is once admitted that this may be
done, methods and ways will soon be discovered to carry it into
unlinkited effect. This cannot be allowed. It -would he a viola-
tion of law by indirection; and what it is illegal to do directly, is
also illegal if done indirectly. For it is the. thing that is for-
bidden, and not the manner of doing it. In whatever formr, then,
whether of law or in equity, this is attempted, the power to do it
is denied by the expre.s words of the statute, by the whole scope
of its intent, and b- the character of the evil sought to be
remedied.
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It was very earnestly contended at the bar, by the learned
counsel for the appellant, that the wife had the power to sell, and
therefore she had the power to mortgage her estate for the pay-
ment of the husband's debts: because the power to sell was the
greater power; and as the greater always contained the less, the
right to mortgage, because it was a form of sale, followed the
power to sell as necessary consequence: Omne major continet in
se minus: Broom's Max. 129; 2 Kent 553, 554; Hamilton's Log.
208. This is an admitted rule of logic and also of law, but it is
not strictly applicable in this- case. The distinction is lost sight
of that the wife can neither sell nor mortgage her separate estate
under the statute, for the payment of the husband's debts. This
would defeat the purpose and words of the act of itself. It would
tear away from the wife its whole protective force, whenever the
husband chose to avail himself of her means. She is much under
the influence of the affections, and shrewd and unscrupulous men
know how to take advantage of this weakness, often to her beg-
gary and ruin, and it is this that the law interposes to prevent.
In Farfield v. _?avesies and Wife, this court have said that "pro-
perty held by the wife, either under the Act of 1850 or under the
Code, cannot be said to be the separate estate of the wife in its
broadest' sense :" 38 Ala. 523. Yet it is in this sense that the
appellant presses his rights on the court. The sale that the wife
and her husband are permitted to make without the aid of a court
of chancery is only such a sale as is mentioned in the act. That
is, a sale for the purpose of reinvesting the proceeds in other pro-
perty, which is also the separate estate of the wife, or for the
support of the family. A mortgage within these limits would be
almost a futile act; and such is not the mortgage here insisted
on: Rev. Code, §§ 2373, 2374, 2376; Alexander v. Saulsbury,
37 Ala. 375; Warfield v. Ravesies and Wife, 38 Id. 518.
It is further urged against the validity of this mortgage that it
is a fraud upon Mrs. Pope, and void for that reason. Her hus-
band is her trustee; the mortgage could not have been accom-
plished without his concurrence; that its execution prejudiced the
trust estate for the benefit of the trustee and not for her benefit;
and that if it is enforced, it will utterly ruin the trust estate solely
for the trustee's individual profit. Bibb knew this, or was bound
to know it, and cannot be excused if he did not. And to permit
him to take advantage of it would be to aid him and the trustee
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to profit by their own injurious acts: Broom's Max. 215, 216
And although the transaction might not be strictly and techni-
cally a fraud, it has the same effect. And upon the same prin-
ciple that the greater contains the less, it may be said with equal
truth that, things equal to the same thing are equal to each other.
So that whatever has the effect of a fraud in the management of a
trust must be treated as a fraud: Rev. Code, § 2372; Johnson v.
Thweatt, 18 Ala. 741; Boney v. Hfollingsworth, 23 Id. 690;
Trippe v. Trnppe, 29 Id. 687; C'harles v. Du Bose, Id. 867; 1
Story's Eq., § 322; 1 Id. 323.
Decree affirmed.
Supreme Court of Mlichigan.
JAMES FOSTER v. THE PEOPLE.
An accomplice who has given testimony criminating himself as well as his
co-defendant, on whose trial he testifies, cannot refuse to answer fully on cross-
examination concerning the entire transaction of which he has undertaken to give
an account, and in which he had shown himself guilty.
Evidence that a person charged with larceny had previously attempted to pur-
chase a chattel similar to that stolen, has no tendency to disprove theft, and is
not admissible for that purpose.
THE opinion-of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-The respondent was informed against jointly
with one William. McCoy, in the Circuit Court for the county of
Macomb, for the larceny of a .horse and some other articles.
Foster was tried separately, and the other defendant, McCoy, was
used by the People as a witness against him.
McCoy proved facts tending to show the guilt of Foster, and
showing also his own guilt in receiving the horse in Detroit and
taking him to Toledo, where the witness was arrested with the
stolen property. Upon cross-examination he. admitted that he
had made an. affidavit for continuance, in which he swore that, as
he had. been advised by counsel, and believed, he had- a good-
defence upon the merits. Counsel for Foster then asked what
that defence was. The counsel for the People objected to the
question, on the ground that a person accused of crime could not,
while a trial was pending, be compelled to disciose his defence.
The court overruled this objection, and then the witness declined
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to answer. The record does not show on what ground the witness
declined. The court refused to direct him to answer. Whether
the witness had or had not such a privilege, it was not an objec-
tion which any one but the witness himself could raise upon the
trial, and probably the court overruled it, when made by the pro-
secutor, on this ground, inasmuch as when made by the witness it
was allowed. Privilege from crimination or the like is no ground
for refusing to allow questions to be put, if not objected to by
the party privileged: 1 Greenl. Ev. § 451; Roscoe Or. Bv. p.
174; note to Thomas v. Newton, 1 Moody & Malk. 48; Com-
monwealth v. ,Shaw, 4 Cush. R. 594; Southard v. Bedford, 6
Qonn. 254.
It- cannot be reasonably claimed that the question was to6
irrelevant to be answered, even if such an objection could be
taken by a witness. Any defence which he may have had against
the charge could only have related to matters directly bearing
upon what he had already testified to, because the charge was
against both him and Foster, and anything throwing light upon
any transaction connected with the history of the theft, from its
inccption to the arrest of the property in his hands, was receiv-
able in evidence on the trial, and was properly received by the
court. If excluded -at all, it must be on some ground of privi-
lege which justified the witness -in refaing to disclose the facts
referred to.
Nor can it be regarded as -unimportant to enable the jury to
appreciate the real character of the witness as a reliable narrator.
It has always been understood that the testimony of accomplices
against a prisoner should be scanned with jealousy; and in many
cases it has been intimated that no conviction could properly be
had upon that alone. We do not hold to this extreme doctrine,
but leave the credit of such persons to the jury; yet the quality
of such testimony can never be regarded as entirely separated
from the character which is indicated by their crimes; and if the
position they occupy indicates moral turpitude, there is a neces-
sity for more thorough cross-examination, and nothing ought to
be shut out which can sensibly aid in explaining their credibility,
unless there is some fixed rule of law that excludes it.
The witness not having given any reason for refusing to answer,
we can only infer what reasons he might have had; and tha only
ones that have been suggested from any quarter are, 1st. His
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L"ii I right to keep to himself his communicatioi:s with counsel
relai", -0t his def.nce; and, 2dly. His right to avoid criminating
himself in any way.
It has been suggested that the crimination which might be
created by an answer to the question would go beyond any
liability upon the larceny and apply on a charge of perjury,
which might lie if he swore to facts making him responsible, and
had before made an affidavit contradicting those facts. If any
necessary contradiction was created by the affidavit, it is difficult
to see how he could be put in any worse condition by explaining
to what it referred. But it is unnecessary to consider that point
here, because no such contradiction appeared. The affidavit that
he had a defence on the merits to this information agrees well
enough with his testimony, because, while proving conclusively
his guilt, he has, so far as his testimony is concerned, disproved
any liability under this information, which charged an offence
in Macomb county, while he swears to acts none of which were
acknowledged to have been committed by him or by his procure-
ment in that county. According to his showing, he could be
held in Wayne and in Monroe, but not in Macomb.
The question therefore narrows itself to an inquiry whether,
after undertaking voluntarily to explain the transactions con-
nected with the larceny and disposition of the property involved
in the charge on trial, and after answering fully-the direct ques-
tioning of the prosecution, and unequivocally criminating him-
self to the extent of complete legal guilt of larceny of that
property, he can then refuse to answer further and be protected
against further disclosures relating to the same transactions.
No principle is better settled than that no inference can be per-
mitted against a witness because he asserts his privilege: Came v.
Litchfield, 2 Mich. R. 840; Rose v. Blakemore, Ryan & Moody
382; Lord ELDON in Lloyd v. Passingham, 16 Ves. R. 64 ;
Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. R. 409. This doctrine is necessary
in order to make the privilege of any value. But the necessity
of making the privilege effectual renders it equally necessary to
take care that where such protection would lead to absurd or un
reasonable consequence, it shall not be allowed.
It would certainly lead to most startling results if an accom-
complce, who had made out a clear showing of a prisoner's guilt,
and has, in doing so, criminated himself to an equal degree, could
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refuse to have his veracity or fairness, or bias or corruption
tested by a cross-examination, and yet be allowed to stand before
court and jury on the same footing with any other witness who
has been perfectly candid, but who may have beer. convicted of a
similar felony. It is perfectly evident that where a witness who
has undertaken to give a full account of a transaction, and has
not spared himself from conclusive accusation, then turns round
and refuses to answer further, his motive must be something more
* than to save himself from the criminal exposure; and it is of
great importance to learn why such a course is adopted. If in
those cases where cross-examination is most desirable, to test the
credit of a man who is seeking to save his own liberty by swear-
ing away that of another, it can be completely prevented at the
option of the witness himself; it would be difficult to justify the
rule which allows co-defendant to be used by the prosecution at
all, when they cannot be received for the defence. I cannot con-
ceive that the law will tolerate such a state of things. When a
man has voluntarily admitted his guilt, he has done all that he
can to criminate himself; and his protection from further disclo-.
sure on the same subject is no protection whatever, because it-
cannot undo what makes the whole mischief.
The cases which apply to ordinary witnesses, who do not stand,
properly on the same footing with accomplices, do not in any way-
sanction such a stretch of privilege. It has been decided, and is.
the received doctrine, that a witness is entitled to decline answer-
ing not only questions which directly criminate him, but also any-
questions which may apply to facts forming links in the chain, of
criminating evidence. And where he has not actually admitted;
criminating facts, the witness may unquestionably stop short at
any point, and determine that he will go no further in that direc-
tion. He may judge that his protection does not require him to
avoid replying concerning some facts, when as to others the'tend-.
ency is or seems to him more direct and incriminating. Yet even
this doctrine, upon the particular facts of the case, although the
witness refused to answer the only question which applied directly
.to the guilt involved, was held in so much doubt in Regina-v. G-ur-
bett, Dennison's Cr. Cas. 236, s. c. 2 Car. & Kir. 474, that the
Court of Exchequer Chamber was unable to agree on the first
argument, and on the second argument, after some changes in the
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Bench, the three Chiefs of the Courts, DENMAN, WILDE and POL-
LOCK, and PATTESO, COLERIDGE and ERLE, JJ., dissented from
the other nine, and held the witness had gone too far to claim
any further. privilege. He had undoubtedly gone very far, but,
nevertheless, he had not convicted himself, and the decision, while
right in its principles, was also correct, as it would seem, upon the
facts. As no opinions are reported, we cannot ascertain the pre-
cise views of the judges, who do not seem to have agreed as to
how far the witness had claimed his privilege. But the rule
which allows a witness to refuse answering questions not directly
pointing to guilt, rests solely on the doctrine that, as in most cases
the crimination would be made out by a series of circumstances,
any one of them may have such a tendency to aid in reaching the
result that an answer concerning it may supply means of convic-
tion by aiding the other proofs which it indicates or supplements
on behalf of the prosecution. The right to decline answering as
to these minor facts is merely accessory to the right to decline
answering to the entire criminating charge, and can be of no
manner of use when that is once admitted, and must be regarded
as waived when the objection to answering to the complete offence
is waived. The law does not endeavor to preserve any vain privi-
leges; and such a privilege as would allow a witness to answer a
principal criminating question, and refuse to answer as to its inci-
dents, would be worse than vain; for, while it .ould not help the
witness, it must inevitably injure the party, who is thus deprived
of the power of cross-examination to test the credibility of a per-
son who may, by avoiding it, indulge his-vindictiveness or corrupt
passions with impunity. The distinction between the cases where
a witness has or has not furnished sufficient evidence to criminate
'himself, is clearly recognised in Amherst v. ifollis, 9 N. H. 107,
.and in Coburn v. Odell, 10 Foster 540, as well as incidentally in
numerous other cases, which hold that when he had once made a
-decisive disclosure his privilege ceased. And the further consi-
* deration is also recognised that a witness ha' no right, under pre-
tence of a claim of privilege, to prejudice a party by a one-sided
* or garbled narrative.
As Mr. Phillips very neatly expresses it: "A witness may
waive his privilege and answer at his peril. From the nature of
:the right it may be inferred that he will be at liberty to answer,
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or to refuse to answer, any questions at his discretion; and that
his consenting to answer some questions ought not to bar his right
to demur to others. On the other hand, it is only reasonable that
he should not be allowed, by any arbitrary use of his privilege, to
make a partial statement of facts to the prejudice of either party :"
2 Phill. Ev. (Edw. ed.) 935.
Accordingly, where a witness has voluntarily answered as to
material criminating facts, it is held with uniformity that he cannot
then stop short and refuse further explanation, but must disclose
fully what he had attempted to relate. This view is adopted by
the text writers, and is very well explained in several of the
authorities where the principle is laid dowu and enforced: 1
Starkie Ev. 206, 19th Am. ed.; Roscoe's Cr. Ev. 174; 1 Greenl.
Ev. § 451; 2 Phill. Ev. 935; 2 Russ. Cr. 931; Coburn v. Odell,
10 Foster 540; State v. K, 4 N. H. 562; State v. Foster, 3
Foster 348; Foster v. Pierce, 11 Gush. 437; Brown v. Brown,
5 Mass. 320; Amherst v. Hollis, 9 N. H. 107; Low v. Mitchell,
18 Me. 272; Chamberlain v. Wilson, 12 Vt. 491; .People v.
Lohman, 2 Barb. 216; Norfolk v. Gaylord, 28 Conn. 809.
In Foster v. Pierce,'11 Gush. R. 437, it is held that where a
witness knows in the beginning that his testimony in the case
must expose him to a criminal charge, he must claim his privilege
in the outset or waive.it altogether. And as applied to cases in
which that is the gist of the inquiry, this rule appears to be neces-
sary and just to prevent partial and unfair statements. It is
probably not designed to apply to any others.
When accomplices are allowed to testify for the purpose of
furnishing evidence against a prisoner, they not only know that
they are expected to criminate themselves, but they do it with the
prospect of an advantage, which, if not absolutely promised, is
substantially pledged to them if they make full disclosures. If
they see fit to furnish criminating proof, there is every reason to
compel them to submit to the fullest and most searching inquiry.
They expressly waive their privilege by giving such proof, for
they could not be sworn at all without their consent while under
a joint indictment; and if not indicted they could still refuse to
furnish evidence of joint misconduct. But there is neither reason
nor show of authority which can in any case allow to them any
privilege whatever when they have gone so far already as to any
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matters in which they and the prisoner on trial have beeii con-
nected. As to separate and purely private transactions, not
connected with the matters under inquiry, they stand like any
other witnesses, because they are not, as to those, accomplices at
all, and no protection is pledged to them on such charges: 2 Russ.
Cr. 927. Even on the principles applied to ordinary witnesses
they would not be protected, as we have seen, after making any
conclusive disclosure. They come upon the stand for no other
purpose, and they have never been allowed, under such circum-
stances, to stop short of a full disclosure. And no privilege is
recognised as then belonging to them: 2 Phill. Ev. (Edw. ed.)
930 note; 2 Russ.Cr. 927; Commonwealth v. Price, 10 Gray's
R. 472; State v. Coudry, 5 Jones's L. R. 418; Brown v. Brown,
5 Mass. R. 320; 2 Phill. Ev. 936.
The witness in the present case ought not to have been per-
mitted to decline answering the question put to him touching the
character of his defence, as alluded to in his affidavit for continu-
ance.
The other error assigned was, that the court ought not to have
refused to allow respondent to prove that,- within the previous six
mbnths, and before the time of the theft, he had applied to the
witness Collyer to purchase a horse. This was to corroborate a
defence set up that respondent purchased the horse alleged to
have been stolen.
We cannot perceive how a desire or offer to purchase a horse
tends to prove that a person did not subsequently steal one. Even
the most inveterate thieves must sometimes purchase articles ; and
the fact that they do so, would not at all interfere with their
misconduct as to others. The evidence was clearly inadmissible,
and its rejection was proper.
But for the other error there should be a new trial.
The other justices concurred.
